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Abstract: This paper tests the moderating role of firm age on the relationship between Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO) duality and financial performance among manufacturing firms in Uganda. A cross section 
survey was adopted using 78 manufacturing firms in Uganda. Data was analyzed using descriptive statistics, 
correlation and hierarchical regression. Modgraph software was also used to ascertain the validity of the set 
hypothesis. Results reveal that whether the CEO doubles as chairman of board or not, this does not 
significantly affect firm Financial Performance. However, as the firms grow older, the role of CEO-Board 
Chairman duality phenomenon gains significance in determining financial performance. Therefore, as firms 
grow in age, the CEOs should not be the same as Board chairpersons if firms have to perform well financially. 
Since only a single research methodological approach was employed in this study, future research can 
undertake to use a mixed methods approach to provide more detailed insights. Further, a longitudinal 
approach can also be employed to study financial performance trends among manufacturing firms over years. 
Entrepreneurs of these firms should put emphasis on proper segregation of the CEO role and those of the 
board chairman especially as firms grow in age. A moderating role of firm age on the relationship between 
CEO duality and financial performance was tested among manufacturing firms; previous studies have tended 
to test the direct or mediating effects. 
 




In this study, we mainly investigate the moderating role of firm age on the relationship between CEO duality 
and financial performance among manufacturing firms in a developing economy perspective. Most 
Manufacturing firms in sub-Saharan Africa provide a fulcrum around which their host economies turn 
(Kamukama, Kyomuhangi, Akisimire, & Orobia , 2017; Mutambi, 2011; Tumwine et al., 2015). In Uganda for 
instance, the industrial manufacturing sector is one of the economic pillars of the economy with a GDP 
contribution of 20%, generating over 80% of manufactured output (UNIDO, 2013; UBOS, 2017). Comparing 
the level of economic performance with the government efforts in developing industrialization, this sector 
should be performing better. Thus, for the economy to prosper there is need to put emphasis on this sector 
because; in addition to its GDP contribution, the sector creates employment for both the skilled and unskilled 
labor as well as providing value addition to the agricultural output for both local consumption and export 
purposes (Nalukenge et al., 2018; Tumwine et al., 2015). Despite their great importance, most manufacturing 
firms have had challenges of poor financial performance and this sometimes leads to firm failure (Mutambi, 
2011; Nkundabanyanga, 2016; Akisimire et al., 2016). 
 
In fact, most of these firms have registered a low return on investment, low return on assets and some of 
them fail to maintain their liquidity levels (Akisimire et al., 2016; Ishengoma & Kappel, 2008). Numerous 
reasons have been observed to cause this poor financial performance. Studies indicate the most of the firms 
have challenges of owner managers that serve both as CEOs and board chairpersons simultaneously. 
Subsequently, this impairs the independence of board members while executing their board duties (Hofmann 
& Lampe, 2013; Mutambi, 2011). Conspicuously, the board is customarily tasked with an oversight role of 
evaluating the management team and CEO (Firth et al., 2014; Cornforth, 2004; Freeman, 2008). Because of 
this, board chairpersons are expected to understand their leadership roles in relation to how it contributes to 
the performance of the firm (Desoky, & Mousa, 2013; Kakabadse & Kakabadse, 2013). Likewise, the CEO is 
tasked with overseeing the daily operations of the business as well as operationalising strategic plans 
(Bathula, 2008). This means that, allowing the CEO to double as the board chairman may cause CEOs to 
perform no duty other than evaluating themselves and the board ends up as a mere rubber stump (Tonello, 
2011). Besides, founder CEOs are observed to have a tendency of treating the organization as their “baby” and 
want to control it as much as possible courtesy of their unified leadership. 
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Something that may hinder firm performance in the long run (Mori, Randøy & Golesorkhi, 2011). Notably, the 
positions of board chairman and CEO command a lot of power and responsibility. Besides, the effectiveness of 
the board and management is largely dependent on the efficacy of the CEO and the board chairman 
respectively (Bathula, 2008). Regulating the power of management and the board affects strategic decisions 
such as financing (Munir, & Li, 2018). Thus, serving dual roles has certainly been cited in most debates as 
paramount in predicting the financial performance of most companies. While well constituted boards are 
important for successful financial performance (Bathula, 2008; Nkundabanyanga, 2016), there is scanty 
literature about what constitutes an effective board and how the CEO duality scenario on the board fosters 
good financial performance of a firm. Extant empirical studies have produced conflicting results (Bathula, 
2008; Adams et al., 2005; Ugwoke et al., 2013; Moscu, 2013) and none of the studies have tested the 
moderating role of firm age on the study variables. Besides, most studies have been conducted in a developed 
economy perspective, leaving other private sector manufacturing firms in developing economies unstudied. 
More so, theories and models that have attempted to explain financial performance as predicted by CEO 
duality have proved to be inadequate in explaining the phenomenon in the private sector firms especially 
those in a developing economy perspective (Freeman, 2008). 
 
And yet, CEO duality is arguably seen as an important board control mechanism in mitigating agency conflicts, 
where owner managers have a tendency of performing a dual roles with the aim of managing succession and 
negotiations (Bathula, 2008; Munir, & Li, 2018). As a result, poor financial performance among 
manufacturing firms remains unexplained, something that creates an empirical and theoretical gap. Because 
of the unique challenges that exist in the turbulent business environment especially in the private sector 
(UNIDO, 2013). This paper focuses on testing the moderating role of firm age on the relationship between 
CEO duality and financial performance among private sector manufacturing firms in Uganda. This is because 
board dynamics are attributed to the firm age differences, in that; the complexities within these firms tend to 
increase as firms grow, resulting into variations in performance (Aktas et al., 2018; Bathula, 2008). Our 
findings are expected to contribute to the scholarly debate about the governance structures from the private 
sector strategic leadership view point using evidence from Uganda. Manufacturing firms in Uganda can use 
the findings to improve their boards by addressing challenges of CEO duality as a tool to foster firm financial 
performance, especially as these firms grow in age. The rest of the paper organized as follows: the next 
section presents literature review and hypotheses. This is followed by the research methodology, the study 
results, discussion and the final section covers the conclusion and implications derived from the study. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
Theoretical Establishment of this Study 
 
The Upper Echelons Theory: The central assumption of the Upper Echelons theory is that organizations are 
a reflection of their top executives and that top executives view their opportunities, threats, alternatives and 
likelihoods of various outcomes through their own perspective (Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Tacheva, 2007). 
The theory attributes the performance outcome of the firm to the characteristics of top management teams 
and associates (Cannella & Holcomb, 2005). As a result, the theory offers a new notion into strategic 
leadership, governance and decision making as well as processes involved in the operations of the firms. 
According to the theory, it is assumed that if one must understand a good strategy, they must understand 
strategists (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). This means that; if the upper level cadres are goods strategist, they 
would ultimately be in position to make good strategies for the company and vice versa. 
 
Therefore, to effectively execute the oversight functions, the boards are left with the task of understanding 
the managerial cognitive behavior within the firms they govern so as to create proper synergies with 
management at an informed point of view other than having mixed ideas. This can be best achieved in 
situations where the CEO serves a dual purpose of chairing the board (Rechner & Dalton, 1991). Even in the 
existence of the diverse board, most of the decisions made in most private sector firms are aligned to the 
interest and perceptions of the owner managers (Dual CEOs). However, based on the assumptions of the 
theory that organizations are a reflection of their top managers (Cannella & Holcomb, 2005; Hambrick & 
Mason, 1984), most of its processes and perspectives proposed have not been put to systematic and 
comprehensive test. Further, the theory still lacks diversity in terms of contextual evidence. 
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Managerial Hegemony Theory: In performing its oversight function, the board is entitled to rely on the 
advice, reports and opinions of management (Huse, 2005). This theory assumes that managers have more 
powers than the rest of the stakeholders (Munir, & Li, 2018) because they have a closer interaction with the 
operations of the business and have the professional knowledge to foster good financial performance (Mace, 
1971). Although this theory was developed with respect to large business corporations (Cornforth, 2004), 
many of the processes it describes are also relevant to small but growing firms. From this perspective, the 
board especially one that is managed by the CEO ends up embracing management’s decisions with no 
fundamental input and because managers are assumed to know the operational details of the day to day 
management of the firm (Huse, 2005; Kakabadse et al., 2013), the board therefore decides to embrace or 
ratify whatever decisions that are taken by management and ends up being mere rubber stamp. Stiles and 
Taylor (2001) in their research on private sector boards also argue that in situations of CEO duality, board 
members are unable to constrain managerial opportunism. 
 
By establishing control mechanisms to keep a focus on organizational goals like financial performance. What 
this informs the current study is that even in the presence of the board, there is a high likelihood of 
management dominance in strategic decision making. Therefore, unless the board is composed of 
independent members that are knowledgeable and strong, management under the leadership of a dual CEO 
may take advantage of the weaknesses to satisfy their own interests. However, one key limitation of the 
Managerial Hegemony theory is that it undermines the role of the board and considers it as playing a passive 
role in the strategic direction of the firm (Nkundabanyanga et al., 2015). The theory does not specify the 
board-management power as well as power boundaries between boards and management (Cornforth, 2004). 
The theory also puts more focus on management dominance and falls short of specificity in addressing how 
resourceful the board is in fostering financial performance. That is why in this study, we combine the 
premises of the Upper Echelons and Managerial Hegemony theories to help complement each other in 
understanding the roles and limitations of CEO duality. 
 
Contextualising Financial Performance: The financial performance is a general measure of an organization 
financial health. It is has for overtime been measured differently, But for this study, we focused on capital 
growth, asset base, return on assets (ROA), return on investments(ROI) profit after tax (PAT) and firm 
revenues as measures of financial performance. (Hofmann & Lampe, 2013; Bathula, 2008; Tumwine et al., 
2015). For instance, Return on investment is a particular metric used to measure the firms profitability, it 
specifically measure the amount of returns on a particular investment in relation to the initial investment 
costs (Mutambi, 2011; Nkundabanyanga, 2016). Mutambi (2011) further explains the key performance 
indicators among manufacturing firms in terms of plant and machinery, output and other capital investments. 
In the manufacturing perspective, scholars like Mutambi (2011) argue that key performance indicators (KPIs) 
among manufacturing firms especially in the recent trend need to be understood mainly because a new 
paradigm of performance has been adopted by most firms in the industry, given the new technological 
advancement. On the contrary, Nkundabanyanga (2016) while analyzing the perceived performance among 
the Ugandan service firms concluded that good financial performance indicators include; equity returns, 
controlled expenditure and profitable investments as well as shareholders in terms of dividends received. 
 
CEO – Chairman Duality in the Context of Financial Performance: The role of the CEO and that of the 
board chairman are often intermingled thus creating the scenario of “CEO-chairman duality” (Bathula, 2008). 
CEO duality holds that these roles are held simultaneously by one party as opposed to independent structures 
where different persons are meant to serve these roles (Freeman, 2008; Brown, 2008). If maintaining control 
is imperative for founders, it is likely that the founder CEOs would serve concurrently as board chairpersons. 
Found out that separating the CEO and board chair positions does not, on its own, improve firm financial 
performance. However, Tonello (2011) argues that the CEO duality threatens board member independence 
and accelerates conflict of interest as well as lowering firm value (Aktaset al., 2018) although Munir and Li, 
(2018) found out that CEOs that are more powerful are less self-centered and tend to make decisions that 
favor financial strengthening of their firms. In fact Mobbs (2015) argues that CEOs who double as board 
chairmen are important in strengthening the human capital of a firm and usually have higher firm valuation. 
However, separation of CEO from the board chairmanship does not necessarily guarantee good performance 
(Tonello, 2011). It is therefore hypothesized that; H1: There is a significant relationship between CEO duality 
and financial performance. 
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Moderating Role of Firm Age on the Relationship between on CEO Duality and Financial Performance: 
It is observed that there has been extant research about the relationship between CEO duality and firms’ 
financial performance. However, most of these studies have focused on the direct relationship and not 
considered contextual factors (Peng, Li, Xie & Zhongfeng, 2010). The adoption of CEO duality structure 
represents the exercise of power by the CEO (Bathula, 2008). However, it has been noted that holding 
multiple titles tends to be a sign of power accumulation and power hoarding (Düztas, 2008; 60). Age is a key 
antecedent of board structure and firm performance (Coad, Holm, Krafft & Quatraro, 2018). Firm age is 
measured by the number of years from the time the firm was incorporated and that firm age has been linked 
to many decisions of the firm (Bathula, 2008; Brown, 2008. Düztas, (2008) stresses that firms go through a 
financial growth and their capital structures vary with the age. Thus, as firms grow, board composition also 
changes in response to the increasing needs. 
 
However, the magnitude of these relationships may differ. For example, founder members that start by 
serving both roles (CEO/Board chairman) may with time surrender one especially as the firm grows in age 
(Munir, & Li, 2018). This may reflect a trade-off between specific benefits of monitoring and costs of such 
monitoring (Freeman, 2008). Relatively younger firms are expected to earn less in terms of revenue turnover 
and overall profitability than older ones (Bathula, 2008; Baisi, 2008). This is because they are under the 
leadership of dual CEOs with less experience in the market and spend a lot of excess funds (Aktas et al., 2018) 
in market penetration programmes so as to build a sustainable market position (Boone et al., 2007; Bathula, 
2008). As a result, they normally have a high costs structure and low return on investment, something that 
may hamper the overall financial performance of the firm. Further, Boone et al. (2007) also suggest that 
complexity in board composition in terms of CEO duality increases with firm age as well as financial 
performance. It is thus hypothesized that; H2: Firm age has a significant moderating effect on the relationship 




Our study adopted a cross-sectional survey approach because the specific and observable fact in question was 
studied at a particular period in time. We also considered a population of 146 manufacturing firms, which had 
boards and at the same time registered under their umbrella body; the Uganda Manufacturers Association. 
Using the Krejcie and Morgan (1970)’s table of sample size determination, a sample size of only 108 firms 
were considered for this study and these were chosen using the MS Excel random selector. Data was collected 
using self-administered questionnaire, while financial performance was ascertained by way of reviewing hard 
data from these firms. However, out of the 108 firms that were studied, only 78 firms responded, making a 
response rate of 72 percent. We distributed five copies of the questionnaire to the board chairman, and four 




Table 1: Descriptive Statistics – Respondents’ Demographics 
Variables Frequency Percentage (%) 
Education levels   
Uganda Advanced Certificate of Education 29 12 
Diploma 19 8 
Degree 102 43 
Masters 54 23 
Ph.D 31 13 
Total 235 100 
Age groups   
26-33 6 3 
34-41 51 22 
42-49 48 20 
50-57 85 36 
58+ 45 19 
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Total 235 100 
Marital status   
Single 29 12 
Married 201 86 
Divorced 5 2 
Total 235 100 
Gender   
Male 162 69 
Female 73 31 
Total 235 100 
Results in table 1 indicate that, the mainstream of most boards that were studied composed of board 
members with a bachelor’s degree as their highest education level (43%); were in the age group of 50-57 
(36%); were married (86%) and were males (69%). Results regarding the nature of boards are presented in 
Table 2 below. 
 
Table 2: Nature of Boards in the Sample 
  Frequency Percent 
Number of directors on the board 3 – 6 14 17.9 
6 – 9 59 75.6 
Over 9 5 6.4 
Total  78 100.0 
Number of female directors do you have on the board Less than 2 1 1.3 
2 – 5 75 96.2 
5 – 10 2 2.6 
Total  78 100.0 
Number of male directors do you have on the board 2 – 5 60 76.9 
 5 – 10 18 23.1 
Total  78 100.0 
Gender of the board chairperson Male 72 92.3 
 Female 6 7.7 
Total  78 100.0 
Is the CEO the same as Board chairman? Yes 43 55.1 
 No 35 44.9 
Total  78 100.0 
Most boards had 6-9 directors (42.6%) while the least number is represented by board members less than 3 
(1.7%). This would imply that most the boards of manufacturing firms in Uganda are composed of board 
members who are at the same time directors or owner of the same firms. 
 
Operationalization and Measurement of Variables 
Global 
Variable 
Operationalization Measurement Sample Questions 
Financial 
performance 
Financial performance was 
measured in terms of revenue, 
return on assets, return on 
equity, return on investment and 
profit after tax (Hofmann& 
Lampe, 2013; Bathula, 2008; 
Tumwine et al., 2015). 
Respondents rank 
items included in the 
questionnaire on a 5-
point scale (1= “Less 
than 2%”, 2= “2 - 5%”, 
3= “5 - 8%”, 4= “8 - 
11%”, 5= “Over 11”) 
Data was captured from the 
financial reports of companies. 
Sample questions included; 
Return on investment has 
increased by…. 
And return on equity has 
increased by…. 
CEO Duality CEO duality is arguably seen as 
an important board control 
mechanism in mitigating agency 
conflicts, where owner managers 
have a tendency of performing a 
dual roles with the aim of 
Independent variable 
was a categorical 
variable and was 
measured using a 
single question 
requiring a response 
Respondents were asked 
whether the board chairman 
doubled as the CEO or not.  
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managing succession and 
negotiations (Bathula, 2008; 
Munir, & Li, 2018). 
of either ‘yes’ or ‘no’ 
 
Firm age This captured as moderating 
variable was captured by 
considering the number of years 
the firm has been in existence 
and this was achieved by 
referring to the certificates of 
incorporation. (Peng, Li, Xie & 
Zhongfeng, 2010) 
Respondents rank 
items included in the 
questionnaire on a 5-
point scale 
 
Respondents were asked the 
number of years the firm has 
been operation and this was 
confirmed by referring to the 
certificates of incorporation  
 
Data Analysis: The data collected was screened for outliers and missing values. This was followed by testing 
the parametric assumptions with an objective of establishing whether to perform parametric tests or non-
parametric tests. Descriptive statistics were used to describe the demographic characteristics of the study 
sample and summarize the data using frequencies, means and standard deviations. Pearson correlation 
analysis was performed to test the associations between the study variables. In order to test the moderation 
effects of firm age, a hierarchical regression was conducted to obtain the relationships between CEO Duality, 
firm age, financial performance and the interaction term. The results were used for a graphical presentation 




Zero Order Correlation Analysis: A Pearson correlation coefficient (r) analysis was conducted to test the 
associations between, CEO Chainman Duality and firm financial performance. Results are presented as shown 
in the table 3 below. 
 
Table 3: Correlation Results 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
CEO Duality-1 1.000       
Firm Revenue-2 -.065 1.000      
Asset Base-3 -.074 .517** 1.000     
Return On Investment-4 -.036 .485** .631** 1.000    
Return On Assets-5 -.071 .475** .379** .496** 1.000   
Profits After Tax-6 .120 .296** .136 .231* .433** 1.000  
Financial Performance-7 -.031 .753** .736** .767** .771** .598** 1.000 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).  
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
The results in table 5 show that there is an insignificant relationship between CEO Chairman Duality and 
overall financial performance (r=-.031, p>.05) and all indicators of financial performance. This implies that 
CEO does not have a significant impact on financial performance among the Ugandan manufacturing firms. 
These findings contradict with those of Bathula (2008) who posits that holding two positions creates a 
powerful individual and thus makes the board less effective in exercising its governance roles. Given all these 
powers, the CEO who doubles as the board chairman tends to possess a lot of dominance (Munir & Li, 2018) 
and is more likely to undermine the decisions taken by the board (Bathula, 2008). To achieve this, it is 
observed that the CEO/chairman purposively appoints mainly friend and family members to perform both 
top management and board duties. Even when such fundamental decisions are taken by the board, 
implementation of such decisions fall on the deaf ears of the same CEO that already has assumed such 
supreme powers (Nkundabanyanga et al., 2015; Melyoki, 2005). Accordingly, the study findings provide no 
support for hypothesis 1. 
 
Moderation Effect of Firm Age: The moderating effect of firm age in the relationship between CEO Duality, 
and financial performance was tested using a hierarchical regression and confirmed using the Modgraph 
software by Jose (2008). The results are as follows. 
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Table 4: Hierarchical Regression Results 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
(Constant) 2.640** 2.719** 5.575** 
CEO Duality -.048 -.047 .180* 
Firm Age  -.024 -.859* 
Interaction Term    .623* 
R .031 .042 .233 
R Square .001 .002 .054 
Std. Error of the Estimate .485 .488 .478 
R Square Change .001 .001 .053 
F Change .075 .057 4.120 
Sig.  .786 .812 .046 
Dependent Variable: Financial Performance  
*. p< .05 and **. p< .01 
The models in table 6 are defined by the following regression equations: 
Model 1: FP = a + b1CD+e 
Model 2: FP = a + b1CD+ b2FA + e 
Model 3: FP = a + b1CD+ b2FA + b3CDFA + e 
Where:  
FP – Financial performance 
a - is a constant, b1, b2, b3 are – unstandarised coefficient 
CD & FA represent centered values of CEO Duality and Firm age respectively 
CDFA represent the interaction term (CEO Duality x firm age) 
 
Results in models 1 and 2 above, show that there is an insignificant relationship between CEO Duality and 
financial performance. However, with the introduction of the interaction term (CEO duality x Firm age) in 
model 3, the results reveal significant inverse relationships between CEO duality and financial performance; 
while the relationship between the interactive term and financial performance was found to be significant (β 
= .623, p<.05). Moreover, the inclusion of the interactive term in model 3 increased the predictive power of 
the main effects by 5 percent (R Square change = .053), from 0.1 percent to 5.3 percent. Since the interactive 
term (CEO duality x firm age) significantly added an extra variance of 5 percent, it means that the interactive 
term boosts the explanatory power of the main effects, thereby causing better results than what the main 
effects would have registered. On the basis of Peng et al. (2010), the result signifies that CEO duality and firm 
age significantly interact or fuse to cause better financial performance of manufacturing firms. The results 
provide support for hypothesis H2.However, Jose (2008) argued that the complementary effect of variables 
can be appropriately confirmed and interpreted basing on the slopes of the graphs. Thus, the means and 
standard deviations of both main effects (centered variables) as well as the un-standardized regression 
coefficients (the Bs for the third model) in the Table 6 were used as inputs to ModGraph Program to generate 
the graph shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure1: Moderation Effect of Firm Age on the Relationship between CEO Duality and Financial 
Performance 
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From figure 1 above, simple slopes for the association between distance and satisfaction were tested for low 
(-1 SD below the mean), moderate (mean), and high (+1 SD above the mean) levels of firm age. Each of the 
simple slope tests revealed a significant negative association between CEO duality and financial performance, 




The debate about CEO duality is not yet definitive because it has not yet exhausted all the contexts both 
methodologically and philosophically. What we found in this study extends the scholarly buildup of the 
debate by introducing the manufacturing sector in Uganda. An insignificant but negative relationship 
between CEO Chairman Duality was observed with financial performance. This means that whether the CEO 
is the same person chairing the board or not, this has nothing to do with level of financial performance among 
manufacturing firms. The justification of this is that, unlike in the public sector where CEOs are mere 
employees doing the agents’ role and in most cases act with self-interests, the contextual situation in the 
private sector is different because most CEO are indeed the owners of the firms and therefore have a special 
attachment to the success or failure of the firm. Considering the role of firm age in moderating the 
relationship between CEO duality and financial performance, it is surprising to note that whereas the direct 
relationship between CEO duality and financial performance was found to be insignificant, the introduction of 
the interaction term (CEO duality x Firm age) reversed the predictive power and showed significant results.  
This means that for CEO duality to cause variations in a firm’s financial performance, there must a moderating 
factor, in this case firm age. The findings lend support to those of Mori, Randøy and Golesorkhi (2011) who 
posit that founder CEOs have a tendency of treating. 
 
The organization as their “baby” and want to hold on to and control it as long as possible. Findings are also 
consistent with the observations of Bathula (2008) whose contentions are in support of a significant 
interactive effect of firm age on CEO duality and financial performance. Important to note is that; as these 
manufacturing firms grow in age and operation increase, they tend evolve overtime and finally get to a point 
that requires the separation of the two duties for governance controls to prevail. Certainly, this was found to 
be a common practice among the Ugandan manufacturing firms with 55.1% of the firms with dual CEOs. 
Empirically, the initial proprietors of these firms were found to have a tendency of holding the two powerful 
positions because of the fear to surrender power as well as achieving strong but ambiguous leadership 
(Nkundabanyanga, 2016). As a result, most firms were found to merely appoint board members just to 
embrace the adoption of governance practices but when in the actual sense, the oversight function is 
performed by CEOs. According to our findings, the CEOs were found to perform more of the operational 
activities by conducting supervisory actions with judicious use of strategies to accomplish certain goals of 
their interests. Our findings concur with those of Bathula (2008) who posits that holding two positions 
creates a powerful individual and thus makes the board less effective in exercising its governance roles. Given 
all these powers, the CEO who doubles as the board chairman tends to possess a lot of hegemony. 
 
Is more likely to undermine the decisions taken by the board as suggested by the managerial hegemony 
theory (Huse, 2005; Mace, 1971). We equally concur with the arguments of Nkundabanyanga et al. (2015) 
and Melyoki, (2005) who posit that; when such fundamental decisions are taken by the board. 
Implementation of such decisions fall on the deaf ears of the same CEO that already has assumed such 
supreme powers. Similarly, Jensen, (1993) also contends that vesting the board roles under the headship of 
the CEO that is a member of management would undermine the oversight functions of the board and finally 
endangers the checks and balances which are essential ingredient of good internal controls. From the 
managerial hegemony theory perspective, CEO duality is on the contrary seen to carry bad performance 
consequences since it is assumed to undermine board function (Fama, 1980; Boyd, 1995; Clark, 1984). And 
because the board of directors is the apex of the decision making or control process of the firm, entrusting the 
CEO with the board chairman position exemplifies the ultimate conflict of interest (Adams et al., 2005; 
Bernard, 2012). Ideally, combining the two sensitive roles could have far reaching implications on 
accountability. This is especially true when the person in charge does not have the organization mission and 
vision at heart especially where the person serving the dual role is not the original proprietor of the business 
(Ugwoke et al., 2013). However, our school of thought stands to agree the augments of the upper echelons 
theory which support CEO duality. 
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This ideology lends similar facts like what was found to empirically transpire with in some of the 
manufacturing, firms in Uganda especially those whose dual role was in the hands of the proprietors. And 
because both management and the board members were appointed by the same CEO/Chairman, it is 
reportedly trouble-free to have both parties operating as a one strong team under the headship of a single 
person. To achieve this, it is observed that the CEO/chairman purposively appoints mainly friend and family 
members to perform both top management and board duties. Ideally, combining two positions offers a single 
focal point for the firm leadership because a powerful CEO/board chairman creates an image of stability and 
instills wellbeing of the employees as well as the shareholders (Bernard, 2012). Interestingly, findings 
indicate that most of the decisions made in most manufacturing firms in Uganda are aligned to the interest 
and perceptions of the top managers especially in situations of CEO duality. 
 
At a macroeconomic perspective, the strategies and direction in which firms view governance ideas is highly 
influenced by the corporate governance systems present in an economy (Nkundabanyanga et al., 2015; 
UNIDO, 2007). Adding to this, our findings indicate that the introduction and operationalization of the 
Institute of Corporate Governance in Uganda in 2008 and the resurrections of the Uganda Manufacturers 
Association have of recent greatly improved the adoption and ideology of effective corporate governance 
practices among the Ugandan manufacturing firms. This therefore presents a valid justification for the 
paradigm shift from the historical norms of “micromanagement” within which industrial enterprises were 
governed to the recent adoption of governance practice. Owing to our findings, it is worth contending that as 
the firm grows in age, founder CEOs who serve dual roles tend to gain more experience and thus are in a 
better position to add value to the firm. 
 
5. Conclusion and Implications 
 
Owing to our findings and the subsequent discussion above, we thus conclude that; whether firms are 
managed by dual CEOs or not, it has no significant impact on the performance levels of manufacturing firms in 
Uganda. Our study makes a deep rooted theoretical contribution by presenting considerable support to the 
upper echelons theory, with less support to the managerial hegemony theory. We further add to the body of 
knowledge by testing the moderating role of firm age. The introduction of firm age as a moderating variable 
reversed the predictive power and showed significant results. This means that, for CEO duality to cause 
variations in a firm’s financial performance, there must a moderating factor; in this case firm age. Perhaps, 
this is because these firms operate in a private sector setting where most CEOs were found to act with 
judicious use of means to accomplish certain goals of their interests. Most firms were majorly family owned 
with owner mangers playing the duo role and most of their boards were composed of members of 
management. Some boards were found to be formed for formality purposes with most of their processes 
under the ambiguous leadership of a duo CEO. And yet, a board room is a place where strategic decisions are 
made, risk overseen and governance issues reviewed. We thus contend that; it is imperative for proprietors to 
have these boards as independent as possible if independent decisions are to be taken overtime especially as 
these firms grow and expand. 
 
This would ultimately mitigate challenges of dominance as well as lessen issues of conflict of interest on the 
board. In fact, this would fundamentally help to manage the succession plan as well as the going concern of 
the business especially where the “young cadres” are mentored into the system. From the managerial 
perspective, since the board is at the apex of the decision making or control process of the firm, the current 
study observed that entrusting the CEO with the board chairman position creates a crisis of “who evaluate 
who”. We thus recommend a considerable segregation of the two duties especially as the firm grows in age 
and where underperforming CEOs may take advantage of the system and its operation. Once these positions 
are separated, it is highly probable that the board under the headship of an independent chairman will set 
key performance indicators for the CEO and his management teams something that may help. To achieve 
sustainable performance as the firm grows in age and expand overtime. Otherwise, combining the two 
sensitive roles could have far reaching implications on stewardship accounting especially when the person in 
charge does not have the organization mission and vision at heart. And because findings indicate that most 
firms are still in their early stages of development, deliberate efforts as suggested by Melyoki, (2005) must be 
devised to evolve effective governance practice that fit a developing economy (Uganda) context. Thus, it is 
reasonable to suggest that; for manufacturing firm in their start up stage. 
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CEO duality may not be a paramount prerequisite though a shift may come by as the firm grows in age. This is 
because of the earlier observation that CEO duality mitigate bureaucratic procedures and escalates the 
efficiency in the decision making process, something that help the firm to undertake sensitive 
accomplishment especially at the point of commencement and market penetration. At policy level, it was 
observed that the introduction and operationalization of the Institute of Corporate Governance. In Uganda in 
2008 and the resurrection of the Uganda manufacturers association (UMA) have of recent greatly improved 
the adoption and ideology of effective corporate governance practices among the Ugandan manufacturing 
firms. However, there is still need for policy makers through the Ministry of Trade, Industry and 
Comparatives, UMA, the Institute of Corporate Governance (ICGU) and others to revise practical governance 
mechanisms that contextually fit in a private sector setting especially the manufacturing firms. The firms in 
the study were found to operate in a turbulent and dynamic business environment characterized by 
numerous business challenges. Some of these firms were found to operate with “micromanagement” style 
especially those under the leadership of dual CEOs. 
 
There is therefore need for the policy makers to create and conduct sensitization programme country wide to 
have the manufacturing firm owners more aware of the continued adoption to the corporate governance 
practice especially on how they structure. Their boards under the leadership of independent chairmen 
especially as these firms grow in age. In fact, as it was earlier put; most firms were found to adopt governance 
practices to depict a good image when in reality, internal operations are different. There is further need to 
have these firms aware of the benefit of having good governance mechanisms especially having boards that 
are well composed with clear and segregated duties, and how this in the end result into sustainable firm 
financial performance. Conclusively, our study adopted a single methodological research approach that was 
limited to quantitative approach. Future research could adopt a mixed approach and triangulate data. Our 
study was also limited to a cross sectional approach, a longitudinal approach could also be adopted to 
understand the financial performance trends among manufacturing firms in Uganda overtime. Lastly, by 
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